The medrash in the opening pasuk of Parshat Shemini compares Ziknei Yisrael (elders of Israel, i.e. Torah leaders) with the wings of a bird: just as a bird cannot fly without wings, Yisrael can not do anything without their Zikeynim. (Yife Toar explains that this refers to the fact that the advice of Torah scholars is followed by Am Yisrael.)
The notion of Torah knowledge imparting to the scholar that learns lishmah the ability to offer wise counsel that individuals can benefit from is found in the beraita of Kinyan Torah (Avot 6:1). The medrash extends the principle to Klal Yisrael, the Jewish community as a whole.
Advice is, by definition, not binding. One who seeks rabbinic advice and chooses to ignore it does not violate halachah. Indeed, if he is convinced, based on superior information , that the Rabbi has erred, he should ignore the advice. Many rabbis do not offer specific counsel when the expertise of others in a particular area exceeds their own. Instead, they advise the questioner to follow the opinion of an expert in the field.
The possibility that the greatest of scholars can err in strict halachah is explicit in Vayikra (4:13 see Rashi). Even in that case, an individual who is convinced that the Sanhedrin erred may not rely on their decision (Horayot 2b).
The Talmud (Gittin 56b) cites the view of Rabbi Akiva that Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai, the greatest Torah leader of his day, erred grievously in a political decision equivalent to advice for Klal Yisrael. While it is true that the Talmud defends Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai's view, and, assuming it is wrong, attributes it to divine intervention which confounded the wisdom of a chacham, nonetheless, the principle of rabbinic fallibility is extended from pure halachah to more general matters.
This exception does not detract from the idea of the medrash cited earlier. Just as in halachah we must follow rabbinic rulings, despite the possibility of error rather than lapse into halachic anarchy (see Sefer HaChinuch, 496) so too in the realm of advice, both personal and communal, we do well by adhering to the counsel of Ziknei Yisrael, even though it is sometimes wrong.
In his eulogy for R. Chaim Ozer z"l, the Rav z"l noted that a Torah leader whose life was devoted to halachic learning and decisions could be relied upon for solutions to political and worldly matters (Divrei Hagut VeHaaracha p.192).
Ironically, the great rabbanim of that very era were criticized for offering bad advice that led to terrible consequences during the Holocaust. The proper resolution is that while Torah confers great insight on general matters to those who pursue it lishmah and master it, mistakes, both large and small, do exist and at times are caused by divine intervention confounding the wise.
Between the body specific halachot, codified in the Shulchan Aruch, and poskim for all generations, and the realm of advice referred to in the medrash, there is a third area: this includes matters which are of a halchic nature, but go beyond specific rules of classical psak. Some have referred to this domain as public policy, a term borrowed from the lexicon of secular law. Some rabbis have defended their refusal to submit to the opinion of acknowledged Torah giants on the grounds that on such issues there is no rabbinic authority. Of course, if this is true, laymen are free to reject the opinions of their rabbis as well.
However, this domain is not limited to public affairs. Rabbanim have traditionally ruled on such matters for both individuals and communities and their rulings were considered as authoritative as any psak in specific ritual or civil law.
A European rav prohibited the introduction of Reform innovations in his kehilla. His psak was accepted even though no technical violation of a particular paragraph of the Shulchan Aruch occurred. Even in private matters, more difficult to enforce or document, most of those who adhered to the Rav's psak on a strict Shulchan Aruch matter followed his more general halachic decisions.
Thus, these decisions should be referred to as halachic policy and as in other areas, the Ziknei Yisrael should be the ones to decide the matter. Moreover, if one submits a question of this nature to a Rav he is bound by the decision which is not merely advice.
With the breakdown of the kehilla system, the decisions of rabannim are not as binding in Shulchan Aruch matters or general halachic matters. Different opinions, sometimes both valid, can coexist in the same community, in both realms, and proper respect should be demonstrated for the view of another. However, in principle, there is the idea that greater Torah knowledge in the specifics of Shas and poskim confers greater authority on matters of halachic policy, and that authority must be accepted.
In the world of Modern Orthodoxy this acceptance is far from universal. American culture, which objects to submission to authority, and the greater tolerance for opposing views, in all halachic areas, generally shown by the Torah scholars of this community have combined to create the illusion that, if no specific classical text is violated, anything goes. This mistaken impression is a grave danger to this community as such and individuals and families that belong to it.
Of course, the principle of rabinnic fallibility applies here as well. Moreover, in halachic policy matters, conditions and nuances can change and lead to different decisions. But, as in the other areas, communities and individuals should look to the Torah scholars of their time, place, and broadly defined community for proper leadership. If this is done, then as the medrash teaches, those who follow can soar to greater heights in all aspects of life.