Then Yosef said to his brothers, 'Come close to me, if you please," and they came close. And he said, 'I am Yosef your brother - it is me, whom you sold into Egypt. And now be not distressed or reproach yourselves for having sold me here, for it was to be a provider that God sent me here ahead of you ...Thus God has sent me ahead of you to ensure your survival in the land and to sustain you...and now it was not you who sent me here but God;...1
These verses are, primo facie, very problematic. Seemingly, Yosef exonerated the brothers from all responsibility in his sale. Ostensibly, Yosef viewed his trials and travails as divinely ordained, and the brothers as mere involuntary divine instruments. This understanding, however, seems untenable. The Torah's narrative in Parshat Vayeshev describes a natural progression culminating in the brothers' willful sale of Yosef.
When his brothers realized that their father loved him more than all the rest, they began to hate him...Then Yosef had a dream...'Do you want to be our king?' retorted the brothers. Because of his dreams and words, they hated him even more...His brothers became very jealous of him...They saw him in the distance and before he reached them, they were plotting to kill him...Judah said to his brothers, 'What will we gain if we kill our brother and cover his blood? Let us sell him...2
Moreover, Yosef's own words preclude any possible exoneration of his brothers. In disclosing his identity to his brothers - just moments before he seemingly exonerated them, Yosef himself sharply rebuked them.
And Yosef said to his brothers...'I am Yosef. Is my father still alive?' But his brothers could not answer him because they were left disconcerted before him.3
The Talmud explains that the brothers were silenced by the sting of Yosef's rebuke.
When Reb Elazar would reach this verse he would cry, 'But his brothers could not answer him because they were disconcerted before him.' The rebuke of flesh and blood is so [forceful] - how much more so the rebuke of the Holy One Blessed be He!4
The Beis HaLevi explicates the words of Chazal.5 Yosef's question regarding "my father" was not an innocent inquiry. The brothers had not returned home since their last audience with Yosef, and thus had no updated information regarding Yaakov. Instead, Yosef's query was accusatory and remonstrative: Is it possible that my father is still alive despite the profound agony you caused him by selling me? Clearly, Yosef considered the brothers culpable in his sale. What then was Yosef expressing when he attributed the vicissitudes of his life to Hakadosh Baruch Hu and disassociated the brothers therefrom?
The answer to this question encapsulates fundamental Jewish teachings regarding human responsibility and divine providence.6 On the one hand, Yahadus adamantly affirms human free will and concomitant responsibility.
Free will is granted to every human being. If one desires to turn toward the good way and be righteous he has the power to do so. If one wishes to turn toward the evil way and be wicked, he is at liberty to do so...This doctrine is an important principle, the pillar of the Law and the commandment...Therefore, a person is judged according to his deeds - if he did good he is rewarded, if he did evil he is punished.7
On the other hand, Yahadus also affirms that divine providence is all-encompassing. I.e., nothing befalls a person haphazardly or by happenstance; everything is divinely ordained.
A person should know and internalize that everything that befalls him, good or bad, is caused by God, blessed is He. And from the hand of his fellow man nothing can come about without the will of God, blessed be He.8
The Torah's teachings regarding free will, human responsibility, and divine providence may be summarized thusly: as subjects, people act with unrestrained free will.9 What we do is voluntarily done. Hence, we are entirely responsible for all our actions. As objects, however, people are governed by divine providence. How - if at all - we are impacted by the voluntary actions of others, is determined by divine providence. Hence, human responsibility not withstanding, Hashem is the true and only cause of everything that happens to us. 10
Of these two propositions, the former is intuitive. We intuitively sense our freedom of action. The latter proposition, however, is unintuitive. Viewed through the Kantian lens of cause and effect, other people's free will appears to impact upon us. Appearances, however, can be beguiling because Hakadosh Baruch Hu offtimes clandestinely exercises hashgacha peratis through natural channels.
The rabbinic providential lens provides a different perspective, as illustrated in the following Talmudic passage:
But if he did not lie in wait, but God caused it to come to his head, etc...As the proverb of the ancient one says, 'From the wicked comes forth wickedness, etc.' What is this verse talking about? About two people each of whom killed a person. One killed inadvertently, and one killed intentionally. This one has no witnesses and this one has no witnesses. The Holy One Blessed is He arranges that they come to the same inn. The one who killed intentionally sits under a ladder, while the one who killed inadvertently descends the ladder and falls upon him and kills him. The one who had killed intentionally is killed, and the one who killed inadvertently is exiled.11
A seemingly random accident occurred because - and only because - it effected divinely ordained consequences. The exercise of free will is unrestricted, but its effects are divinely determined and choreographed. With striving and sensitivity we can adopt the providential lens and, our vision thereby invigorated and enriched, at times, discern the guiding hand of providence.
Yosef HaTzaddik's reaction to his ordeal reflected this subject / object distinction and providential principle. On the one hand, he recognized that his brothers acted voluntarily and accordingly held them responsible for their actions; hence his sharp rebuke. On the other hand, Yosef also understood that Hakadosh Baruch Hu allowed the brothers to implement their designs because - and only because - his ordeal was divinely ordained. Hashem was the true, ultimate cause of his (mis)fortune. Hence, as depicted by the medrash12 he immediately responded to his sale by repenting and never desired revenge. Human nature impels us to seek revenge from those who are responsible for our plight. When we recognize that Hashem is the ultimate and first cause of everything which we, as objects, endure, then the very thought of revenge becomes nonsensical.
Yosef encapsulated this profound teaching in his response to his brothers. He was, at once, remonstrative and reassuring. "Is my father still alive?" - as subjects you acted freely and thus sinned grievously. "It was not you who sent me here, but God." - as an object, my destiny was exclusively determined by the will of God. And thus do not be disconcerted; I do not seek revenge.
In fact, the Sefer HaChinuch articulates this providential principle as the rationale for the Torah's prohibition against revenge:
Amongst the reasons for the mitzvah: that a person should know and internalize that anything that befalls him, good or bad is caused by God, blessed be He. And from the hand of his fellow man nothing can come about without the will of God, blessed is He. Therefore, when someone causes him distress or pain, a person should know in his soul that his sins are the cause, and Hashem may He be blessed decreed this upon him, and he should not train his thoughts to exact revenge from him because he is not the source of his misfortune, because sin is the cause.13
It is worth noting that the foregoing analysis of free will and divine providence also encapsulates a philosophy of history. History unfolds on two levels and accordingly may be properly studied bilaterally.14 History unfolds naturally, its agents acting freely. Accordingly, the natural causes and contexts of their actions may be probed. Simultaneously, history unfolds supernaturally, its course set and steered by Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Accordingly, the ultimate causes of historical events are located in the religio-providential realm and, when possible, history ought to be explored accordingly.15
Upon reflection we find instances of such bilateral historical analysis in Chazal:
Rabbi Chama son of Gurya said in the name of Rav: a person should never show favoritism amongst his children because on account of two selaim of choice wool with which Yaakov made a woolen garment for Yosef his brothers became envious and things evolved and our ancestors became ensnared in Egypt.16
Chazal identified the natural trigger for the chain of events culminating in servitude in Egypt. Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear that the ultimate cause was providential, as had been foretold to Avraham:
And He said to Avram, 'Know that your descendants will be strangers in a foreign land, and they will enslave and torture them.'17
And, in conclusion, we should note that the providential principle, and Yosef HaTzaddik's application thereof illustrate a pivotal concept within yahadus. Yahadus comprised of creed and deed, teaches that belief molds behavior. Case in point: belief in divine providence is not simply an intellectual conviction; rather, as evidenced in the foregoing analysis, it also molds our actions and reactions, undercutting personal animosity and desire for revenge.
1. Genesis 45:4-8, trans. Stone edition of Chumash
2. ibid. 37:4-27, trans. the Living Torah
3. ibid. 45:3, trans. Stone
4. BT Chagiga 4b
5. Beis HaLevi al HaTorah ad loc.
6. In this essay I operate with the conception that divine providence is all-encompassing, as explained in the text. While this view is vigorously and explicitly expoused by some Rishonim and in some maamarei Chazal as documented below, it does not represent a consensus omnium. See, inter alia, BT Moed Katan 28a and Hasogas HaRe'Avad to Hilchos Teshuva 6:3.
7. Rambam Hilchos Teshuva 5:1,3,4
8. Sefer HaChinuch Mitzvah 241
9. Those extreme instances in which a person is deprived of his free will as punishment for egregious sinning is not our present focus. See Rambam Hilchos Teshuvah 6:3
10. Of course, the mere mention of divine providence poses the problem of theodicy. That vexing and intricate issue, however, is beyond the scope of this essay.
11. BT Makot 10b
12. Bereishis Rabbah
13. op cit note 8
14. This perspective on history and the study thereof was provided by my revered father zt"l
15. See, by way of example, BT Yoma 9b, Shabbos 31b ff
16. BT Shabbos 10b
17. Genesis 15:13